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ABSTRACT
Pbverty alleviation is mainly about redistribution of economic, social and political
resources, and all forms of redistribution carry a built-in conflict potential.
However, there are political and social means available to contain such conflicts.
Some of these means are discussed through a presentation of the historical devel-
opment of Norway from a poverty ridden country to a wealthy country where
redistributive measures dominate the economic and social life of a modern wel-
fare state.
THE BUILT-IN CONFLICTS OF DISTRIBUTION AND
REDISTRIBUTION
There are two theses in social policy theory which seem to be indisputable: i) No
social problem can be alleviated (and certainly not solved) without some kind of
distribution or redistribution of economic, political or social resources, ii) All kinds
of distribution and redistribution have a built-in conflict potential, no matter how
trivial the distribution/redistribution seems to be.
These are the harsh realities which policy-makers and voluntary organisa-
tions engaging in the field have to relate to. There is no way of avoiding them, but
under certain circumstances the conflicts can be contained and minimised.
One way of looking at poverty is to see it as part of a social, economic and
symbolic hierarchy, with the poor placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. The
longer a state of poverty has lasted, the more established the hierarchy will
become. Transfer of resources to the poor upsets such an established hierarchy,
both in actual and symbolic terms. Arguments like 'the poor are moving out of
their place', 'they are becoming like us', they are getting something for free', are
signals that an accepted balance and important symbols are threatened.
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It is not only those who foot the bill, the wealthy or the tax payers, who are
challenged by such imbalance. Studies show that 'the almost poor' ie, those
groups who are just above the poor in the hierarchy, express the most negative
attitudes towards resource transfers to the poor. They lose 'their' underclass, and
relatively speaking they move closer to the bottom of the hierarchy.
The more comprehensive the amount of transfers to the poor, and the more
the transfer contains of political, economic and social resources, the larger the con-
flict potential involved. Massive transfers will interfere even more with the estab-
lished balance. The injection of resources upgrades the social position of the poor
(which is really what welfare measures should be about), thereby threatening still
larger parts of society.
Internal transfer of resources, ie, transfers from non-poor groups to the poor
within the same culture/country, is likely to carry the largest conflict potential. The
non-poor experience a direct loss of accumulated resources. This is particularly so
where the percentage of poor people is high. External transfers, ie, transfers from
other countries or from international agencies, carry a large conflict potential, for
reasons mentioned above.
So far economic growth or an otherwise accumulated surplus have been seen
as a necessary prerequisite to avoid conflicts stemming from redistribution.
However, studies do not present a unanimous picture on this point. Welfare mea-
sures have been developed both during economic growth and during periods of
economic hardship. Much is still to be done analytically to resolve this argument,
including the fact that one result of economic growth is the increased differentia-
tion in the income distribution, thereby increasing also poverty, both in absolute
and in relative terms. Also, the effects of economic growth have differential effects,
as seen for example in the different impacts on rural and urban poverty.
Where poverty problems are closely linked to other conflicts such as ethnic
and political problems, pressure on land use and water resources, the built-in con-
flict in the transfers is likely to increase further.
THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF POVERTY
On the one hand, it can be argued that poverty needs to be alleviated, both for
humanitarian reasons and for the loss of human capital being wasted when peo-
ple have to use all their energies to survive. It can also be argued that poverty is
costly to society because it increases the risk to society at large of epidemics, crime
exposure, pollution and waste.
On the other hand, and much less acknowledged, it can be argued that
poverty is actually an asset to certain parts of society. Poor people constitute
cheap, flexible and unorganised labour whose mere existence puts a lid on wage
demands. A certain amount of poor people is functional for the economy because
the poor buy and consume second and third grade products which would other-
wise be wasted. Also, poor people form part of the silent majority' on whose
behalf politicians and bureaucrats can act without being accountable. There are
countries where the votes of the poor can be bought for very little money, and
there are countries where the poor function as 'clients' for a patron who is given
a blank signature to act in all political matters, no matter their contents. It can be
doubted whether such decision-making actually attends to the interests of the
poor. Without poor people such political systems would break down. Add to this
that there are non-poor people who benefit financially when they transfer the risk
of their illegal behaviour to the poor through modest payments, for example, the
use of couriers in drug trafficking or prostitutes. The poor are also symbolically
useful, as examples of illiterate, lazy, dirty and inferior human beings who serve
as a bogey to demonstrate the superior status of the moral standards of the non-
Little is known about how much the non-poor actually have vested in sus-
taining a certain amount of poverty. Even less is known about how much pover-
ty is functional for a certain society, and at what stage a certain amount of poverty
turns into being dysfunctional for the same society.
It is interesting to note that the built-in conflict potential in distributive mea-
sures stems from two sources. The non-poor society may experience loss both
through their direct contribution to redistributive measures, and through a loss of
reduced utilities of a shrinking poor population.
In the following is presented a case exposing some distributive measures of
poverty alleviation which over time led to the eradication of poverty, while at the
same time keeping the distributional conflicts at a low level.
THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE
Today Norway is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. Few would have
predicted this half a century ago when the country was marred by five years of
foreign occupation. However, it was in this situation, right after the war, that the
political parties in a joint declaration pronounced their willingness to fund and
organise those basic national institutions which are now at the core of the welfare
But the story goes further back, to a time when Norway was one of the poor-
est countries in Europe. Although it is difficult to date the exact beginning of the
welfare state, there seems to be an agreement that the humanitarian organisations
blossoming during the 19th century were the driving forces behind a push for a
more general social commitment to deal with extensive poverty and misery. Those
informal organisations helped create the awareness of the problems and to set the
ethical standards necessary for welfare measures to be implemented. They catered
for traditional problems created through illness, widowhood and orphanage,
along with the new problems due to accidents at the factories, child labour and
health risks brought about through early industrialisation. Once the labour unions
became established they became important actors in the fight for industrial pro-
tection and measures of social protection. After the turn of the century the health
care professionals became another set of important actors in the push for a public
health care system, along with popular movements promoting hygiene, prenatal
care and proper nutrition. School lunches, for example, became one of the sym-
bols for a new and more healthy society. All along, the political parties monitored
their special interests towards shaping the welfare state, and ferocious debates
were exchanged on principles of financing, benefits, obligations and the responsi-
bility of the individual. (Interestingly enough, the arguments from those debates
some 60 and 70 years ago are still the same, both in Norway and in other coun-
After a halting start in the beginning of the century the public sector took
over some of the welfare measures, and local welfare programmes grew like
mushrooms, slowly converging into national social policy programmes. In 1995
the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs celebrated the centennial of
the first social security programme. The real boom came in the 1960s which saw a
series of national social security programmes based on cash transfers to the elder-
ly, the disabled, single providers, orphans, families with children, unemployed,
and those temporarily out of work because of illness or pregnancy. The public
health care system was already well established, and became further cemented in
the public sphere through its close financial ties to the national social security sys-
tem. The 1970s saw the institutional fortification of the welfare state, both in the
bureaucracy and in the caring for the elderly and disabled. During the following
decade when the welfare state was under attack from the conservatives, the
bureaucrats and the professionals came out as its staunchest supporters, cheered
along by a majority opinion in the population.
Much of the welfare state building happened before the oil revenues were
even known. But the further expansion of the welfare state has built heavily on
the income from the North Sea oil fields, and is likely to continue doing so.
In this very short expose it is only possible to stress a few of the factors which
led to the development of a comprehensive welfare state. Besides, historians and
social scientists between them still have not resolved which were the dominant
factors behind this development.
Basically, we can distinguish three kinds of factors influencing the process of
poverty alleviation: those characteristics of the country already in existence which
were of relevance for poverty alleviation; those political decisions which indirect-
ly helped poverty alleviation, but were actually aimed at improving the opportu-
nities and quality of life for all the citizens; those policies which were directly
aimed at alleviating'poverty.
In the first category can be emphasised the small size of the country, the
homogeneity of the population created through a long history built on joint tra-
ditions, and the early development of democratic institutions. Noted should like-
wise be the opportunity created for mass emigration to the American continent
when the pressure on scarce land resources in the Mth century created
widespread famine, and later, the massive need for labour in the period of recon-
struction after the Second World War. Both of these phenomena had more impact
on poverty alleviation than any welfare measure could possibly have.
In the second category can be counted political decisions such as progressive
tax laws and targeted tax deductions, concessions to the rural sector, public own-
ership of some vital industries and infrastructure, control of imports and foreign
investments, protection of internal trade and local use of resources, just to men-
tion a few examples of the state interventions.
In the third category fall the packages of public health and social policy pro-
grammes which helped wipe out mass poverty and to sustain a fairly decent level
of living for the majority of the population, including those outside the workforce.
The homogeneity of the population was expressed through a core of com-
mon values of what was right and proper behaviour. Taking into account the
smallness of the population and the relative visibility of its members (partly due
to the local political institutions and the involvement of popular movements),
these factors gave way to an empathy with the less fortunate and a call for justice
and equality. Some historians may add that the occupation of Norway by foreign
powers (Denmark and Sweden) for close to 500 years and the consequent lack of
a national elite, created a foundation for solidarity among the ordinary people
which has been instrumental in later calls for equality and disdain for those who
consider themselves superior to others. (Norway actually has a set of informal
rules called the 'Law of Jante' which in ten paragraphs outlines why no individ-
ual should behave in such a way that they portray themselves to be more valu-
able human beings than other people!).
A strong state and the existence of democratic institutions were key factors in
containing the conflict potential of the many and comprehensive transfers embed-
ded in the proposed welfare measures. As part of the political process, the pro-
posals went through elaborate and organised processing in committees and
interest groups, being changed and adapted before final approval.
Although it could hardly be known at the time, the choice of principles for the
welfare state turned out to be more sustainable than other choices put forward.
F O U R PILLARS OF THE WELFARE STATE
The actual outcome of this historical development is still not easy to grasp.
Therefore, a warning should be issued at this stage: the Norwegian welfare state
has now become such a complex organisation that no analytical scheme lends
itself easily to an evaluation of the many health and social programmes making
up the welfare state. The four basic principles outlined below have become altered
and diluted within many of the social programmes, but they still represent a base-
line for the ideology of the welfare state.
Universalism vs Targeting
Two of the major conflicts in Norway centred (as elsewhere) around the issue of
who was to benefit from new welfare measures, and who was to foot the bill. The
tradition has been to create welfare measures which target the needy and deserv-
ing part of the population. The benefits have usually been low, and payments
have in varying degree come from the church, philanthropists, voluntary organi-
sations, the local community, taxpayers, employers, the state, and international
organisations.
Much can be said in favour of targeting. If the target group is well defined
and the welfare measure precisely tailored to the needs of the target group, the
efficiency of the resources directed towards the group is likely to be very high. As
long as the benefits are kept low and the benefit receivers are considered deserv-
ing by the non-poor, targeting as a welfare measure carries a fairly low conflict
potential. It is at the same time a measure with a pending conflict potential
because criteria for transfers and level of benefits are left open to still new negoti-
ations.
Much can also be said against targeting. One of the problems is, of course,
the difficulties with a precise definition of the needy. Another problem is the
administrative costs involved in sorting the needy from the not-so needy. A third
problem is the handling of the borderline cases and the perceptions of justice
involved. A fourth problem is the low level of benefits which really does not
'solve' poverty. The levels are usually kept low, both out of consideration to moral
issues and to the availability of labour. Still another problem, which is of a psy-
chological character, is the unease, or even stigma, which inescapably follows tar-
geted transfers. Needy people become equipped with an extra load on their
shoulders when targeted, which by the way is functional since it works as a
rationing mechanism towards further claims.
Universalism is a type of distribution which embraces all citizens, and in the
ideal form gives them the same benefits and the same obligations. It can be
summed up as a costly measure with low target efficiency, and it is no wonder
that most economists are against it.
However, universalistic welfare measures have other qualities, which in the
language of the economists may be counted out as externalities. First of all, uni-
versalistic measures have a low conflict potential because all citizens benefit. That
may be particularly pertinent in a country characterised by homogeneity and
strong norms of equality. Secondly, universalistic measures reinforce democratic
institutions and the unique value of the individual, no matter how marginal or
poor a person is. Thirdly, universalistic measures tie the individuals closer to the
society in financial terms, and the majority of the beneficiaries will have a vested
interest in defending their benefits. It may be hypothesised that such measures
also have a psychological value and increase the citizens' feeling of belonging to
the society. Administratively universal arrangements are cheap to run, and stig-
ma tisation is avoided.
Both the principle of targeting and that of universalism have ruled the
ground in the Norwegian welfare state, the former steadily losing out as still more
comprehensive universal welfare measures have taken over. However, lately the
renewed interest for market liberalism has brought back the discussion about
increased targeting.
Universalistic principles in obligations have hardly been an issue. All
Norwegian citizens earning an income have to pay into the public social security
system (including the health care system), as do employers on behalf of their
employees. The size of the compulsory payments is part of the public debate, but
few will dispense with the condition of about half a century, where all citizens
have benefits as well as obligations in the welfare state.
Social Rights as Citizen Rights
Much has been written on what kind of rights should be extended from the com-
munity/the state to a citizen, in particular in the British literature. Into the discus-
sion are woven issues of the responsibility of the state versus the responsibility of
the individual, liberalism versus socialism, privatisation versus public engage-
ment, moral punishment versus investment in human capital, and how private
and public resources shall be distributed.
The pros and cons for a fixed poverty line reflect part of this discussion. One
of the largest social science studies ever undertaken was a series of projects on the
consequences of introducing a nation-wide poverty line through a negative
income tax in the United States. The major aim of the study was to evaluate the
expected loss in available labour power if such social rights were introduced. The
final estimates of the loss ran between five and ten percent. However, other results
were more surprising. Through controlled experiments, those deprived families
who had a guaranteed income, even low as it was, the mothers gave birth to
babies with a higher average birth weight than comparable families without a pre-
dictable income. The children from the families with a right to an income also
stayed longer in secondary school than did children from families with an unpre-
dictable income. If the results from these studies are of a more general nature, they
are of significance for poverty alleviation. Increased birth weight is acknowledged
as a vital instrument in the battle against malnutrition and prevention of health
problems. Prolonged school attendance is a vital instrument for breaking out of a
poverty situation. If predictability in income through allocation of social rights is
as powerful as indicated here, the discussion on the consequences of allocating
social rights needs to be rethought and brought into the policy-making arena
where poverty alleviation is at stake.
This outlook coincides with the more general issue located in the philosophy
of human rights, that granted rights protection first and foremost to the most vul-
nerable groups. This is partly because the social structure provides the best oppor-
tunities for those who are already well integrated in the society and partly because
marginal groups lack the power and institutional energy to fight for themselves
and their needs repeatedly.
Universalistic measures and the concept of social rights are of course closely
tied together, as the former includes the latter, while the latter does not necessar-
ily include the former.
In Norway today the tendency has been for extending the social rights of the
citizens still further and into still newer areas. At the same time private insurance
arrangements have increased. For the uninitiated it should be added that Norway
is not a socialistic country. The Norwegian economy consists of a public/private
mix, and politically Norway has moved further to the right during the last decade,
in spite of a social-democratic government.
Equality and Justice
If one were to do a content analysis of the tons of paper and documentation which
at one time or another have been fed into the preparations and evaluations of the
many programmes under the Norwegian welfare state, the words equality and jus-
tice would turn up frequently. As mentioned earlier, they are linked to basic val-
ues in the Norwegian society, although equality is considered a less attractive
value now than just a few years ago. Also the verbal use of the two concepts forms
part of the conflict reduction of a new distribution.
At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between equality in input and
equality in outcome. Expectations of equality in input, such as equal access to the
health care system, and equal rights to benefits, are strong, while expectations of
an equal outcome for the individual going through the educational system, the
health care system or the social security system, are a non-issue. In principle,
everybody should be given the same opportunity, but how these opportunities are
utilised only becomes an issue if somebody falls below certain acceptable stan-
The distributional outcomes of equal inputs are not easy to predict, of course.
An often cited illustration of the unknown consequences of extending retirement
benefits to the elderly, is how the balance of power between the generations in the
rural areas can become upset. When the elderly suddenly control the only stable
cash income in a household based on foodstuffs and cash in kind, they regain a
control they had left behind when the farm was turned over to the next genera-
tion. The history of social policy is full of such examples.
Emphasis on justice and equality at the same time does not necessarily lead
to the same kind of distribution. While it may be considered 'jusf that all citizens
should be treated equally and receive the same retirement benefits, it is not con-
sidered just that those citizens who have paid more into the social security system
than others (because they have worked longer and earned more) should receive
the same level of benefits as those citizens who never worked outside the home.
These two kinds of seemingly opposed perceptions of justice are nicely taken care
of in the Norwegian retirement scheme. Every citizen receives a basic retirement
pension, irrespective of how much he or she has paid into the system. Women in
particular benefit from this scheme. Those citizens who have paid more into the
system receive an additional benefit, reflecting the size of their input. But here the
principle of equality reigns again. An upper limit is set to the amount of additional
benefit paid out, irrespective of the amount a wealthy citizen has had to pay into
the system. Once more, a distributional system has been created which has a low
conflict potential.
The Strong State
Distribution/redistribution of economic as well as of social and political resources
calls for strong actors on behalf of those who are at the lower end of the distribu-
tion. During the development of the Norwegian welfare measures, many such
actors have been involved, as mentioned above. The strongest, and maybe most
impartial, actor has been the state, through the democratic institutions and the
bureaucracy. Neither universalistic measures, nor the establishment of social
rights and approximating equal measures incorporating the least resourceful part
of the population, would have been possible without the existence of a state with
legitimacy, integrity and the authority to prioritise communal resources.
Since distributions/redistributions are never won once and for all, welfare
measures need to be built into sustainable institutions, be granted legitimacy
through legitimate bodies, and have strong and independent surveyors following
the agreed upon rules of distribution. The surveyors can be much the same actors
as mentioned before, including the media and the general informed public.
THE ROLE OF THE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS
Distributions and welfare measures touch upon so many different kinds of inter-
ests that it is not surprising to observe the manifold actors entering the field, try-
ing to influence the outcome one way or the other. In addition to this is the fact
that delivery of semi-private welfare services has become part of a very attractive
market, particularly in developing countries. International organisations, for
example, feed sizeable economic resources into this market, based on the belief
that voluntary organisations are a less expensive and more easily controlled
medium for organising services than welfare measures organised through the
The voluntary organisations are a heterogeneous group, both with respect to
activities, ideology, flexibility, size, involvement of members and potential for a
long-lived existence. All these factors have to be taken into account when
analysing the role of those organisations.
The arena for the voluntary organisations is determined by the role of the
state and its responsibilities in the welfare sector, to such a degree that it can be
termed a symbiotic relationship. Within a weak state with limited powers and low
legitimacy, ample room is provided for voluntary organisations to define their
activities and priorities, without interference and control. Within a strong state
already engaged in the distribution of welfare measures, the voluntary organisa-
tions have to play second fiddle and engage in those activities which are 'left over'
from the welfare measures in the public sphere. Not surprisingly, there is ambiva-
lence and a certain conflict potential built into the relationship between the strong
state and the voluntary organisations. The ambivalence stems from the acceptance
that the state can never fulfil all the welfare obligations towards its citizens, so the
contributions of the voluntary organisations are needed to complement the pub-
lic engagements. The conflict stems from the unclear division of labour between
the state initiated welfare measures and those measures set by voluntary organi-
sations, characterised by different goals and ambitions.
The discussion of the role of the voluntary organisations becomes muddled
when infiltrated by the discussion of private versus public responsibility for dis-
tributing welfare measures. In functional terms there are really two separate
issues, one belonging to the political sphere where privatisation/public engage-
ment is an overriding issue, and the other belonging to a discussion on how to dis-
tribute welfare measures in the most efficient way. Another ideological trend
which has gained prominence lately is the push for more decentralisation of pub-
lic activities, including welfare measures. This is also a discussion which muddles
the picture. Decentralisation has been interpreted in several ways: one is to
empower local democracy, another is to cut down on the powers of the state, just
to mention a couple of interpretations. For the welfare state, decentralisation
(according to how it is implemented) is likely to make the pillars of equality, social
rights and universalism more fragile. For the voluntary organisations, decentrali-
sation will expand their arena and give more scope for initiatives tailored to the
organisations' specific interests.
During the development of the Norwegian welfare state the role of the vol-
untary organisations has changed over time. Roughly speaking, these organisa-
tions have gone through three stages: that of being innovators and driving forces
behind humanitarian welfare measures; a period of hesitance when defining the
space for new initiatives as the welfare state took over; and a development into
interest groups for and by specific groups of disabled people, following with vig-
ilance the public welfare measures and pressing for still larger benefits in cash and
kind for their own group. Many of the voluntary groups in the welfare sphere are
subsidised by public grants, and most of the groups would fold if these grants
were withdrawn. The groups are in principle under a certain control of the pub-
lic authorities, their economy in particular. The welfare professions play a double
role here, as they are both integrated in such groups, and at the same time argue
that interference by non-professionals can be harmful to disabled' people.
The integration of the public sphere and the voluntary organisations raises a
whole set of questions. To which extent should the voluntary organisations be
obliged to follow the same ideology for their activities as the one laid down for
public welfare measures? Should their loyalty be with the public welfare mea-
sures, or should they take on the critical role of external surveyor mentioned
above? How much loyalty should they invest in the ideology provided by the
organisations which finance them? How large can the voluntary sector grow
before it becomes a threat to the public welfare measures? What is the optimal
division of labour between the public and the voluntary sphere? When does the
voluntary sector perform better than the public sector? How can the voluntary
sector enforce the growth of democratic institutions? How can greedy profit-ori-
ented voluntary organisations be sorted out from that part of the voluntary sector
which is needed to improve the quality of life for marginalised citizens? Do the
voluntary organisations need to be early innovators of welfare measures now that
lessons can be learned from other cultures? Or should they rather turn to the edu-
cational process of communicating to the non-poor what a life in poverty is like,
and why it is also in the interest of the non-poor that poverty be alleviated? As it
now stands, few poverty alleviating measures can be implemented without the
moral and political support of the non-poor. Long-term investments in welfare
measures directed only at the poor tend to fail if the non-poor are not co-opted
and integrated in the process.
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
One other actor should be mentioned in particular, because it is one of the most
forceful in the welfare sector of developing countries.
The World Bank has for a long time called for economic growth as a means
to overcome poverty on the national level and to create resources to alleviate
poverty on the individual level. The ideology is based on a strengthening of the
market forces and a liberalisation of economic regulations. More specifically the
Bank prescribes a medicine of less state intervention, a smaller public sector,
increased privatisation in all social sectors, a rudimentary public 'core of health
care' only for the most deprived, a limited targeting of marginalised groups, only
'basic education' provided by the public sector, and a 'fee for services' otherwise.
Let it be said immediately: // the World Bank had been in existence and set these
demands to the poor Norwegian society when it tried to struggle out of poverty and pro-
vide a better quality of life for its citizens, Norway would never have succeeded.
The Norwegian welfare state would never have come into existence, and the
foundation for the present riches of the Norwegian society would not have
emerged, oil or no oil. One basis for the Norwegian road to success was the broad
public education provided for all citizens. The strong state which controlled its
own economy was a prerequisite for rebuilding the society after the Second World
War. For example, in order to save an out-flow of foreign capital, no Norwegian
citizen was allowed to buy a foreign car until the early 1960s. Oranges were con-
sidered a luxury good in the cold Northern climate and could only be imported
at Christmas! Internal capital flows were likewise regulated. Building materials,
for example, were a scarce commodity and priority was given to the construction
of industrial buildings. Licences were needed for building private houses, and
their size was limited.
Public subsidies were provided for industries at jeopardy to secure jobs and
incomes for ordinary people. The agricultural sector was subsidised, and services
considered important for the country, such as the telephone, electricity, water-
works, postal services, ferries and railroads, were public property.
All these policies, which together laid the foundation for the economic suc-
cess of the country and the welfare state, would have been impossible today if the
World Bank had had the authority to intervene in the Norwegian society.
The four pillars of the welfare state described above, would likewise have
been unacceptable under the ideology of the World Bank. Targeted welfare mea-
sures would have had to replace universalistic measures, social rights would have
been limited to a core of very poor people for as long as they stayed very poor,
the ideology of equality would have had to yield to larger differentiation in the
population, and the power of the strong state would have been winged.
It is certainly a paradox that developing countries now are forced to accept a
set of instruments to induce an economic growth which is supposed to lead to
improved quality of life for the citizens, while at the same time they are prevent-
ed from making use of such instruments which have proved efficient in improv-
ing quality of life for citizens in other countries.
The Norwegian government is also faced with a difficult paradox vis-å-vis
the World Bank. Percentage-wise the Norwegian state is one of the large donors
to the World Bank, thereby giving legitimacy to an ideology which is contradicto-
ry to the ideology of the Norwegian welfare state. So far, this is an issue which has
not yet received full attention in the political sphere.
THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISCUSSION FOR BOTSWANA
It is difficult to judge how much of the Norwegian history is of relevance for a
country of a very different composition and history. From a distance it looks as if
the instruments used for creating a better quality of life for the citizens in one of
the small and poor countries a long time ago, may be of some use in this Botswana
Society Symposium. While all kinds of warnings should be issued against draw-
ing parallels, some of the elements presented here are of a sufficiently general
value to be taken into consideration wherever new welfare measures are consid-
ered. But now policy-makers and scholars going into the discussions have the
advantage of knowing more precisely what the problems of marginalisation and
poverty are, and which welfare measures have been through the process of trial
and error in other countries. Such a knowledge was not available in the early days
of the Norwegian society, and that may be another reason why it took more than
a hundred years to eradicate poverty.
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DISCUSSION OF ØYEN PAPER
Discussant: Taolo Lucas, University of Botswana
The discussant, Taolo Lucas, noted that the Øyen paper gave a clear account of the
history of the welfare state in Norway, and said that this has some relevance for
the situation in Botswana. He singled out four factors favouring the creation of the
welfare state in Norway:
1. Humanitarian and voluntary organisations that helped to create an aware-
ness of the existing problems.
2. Political forces that seemed to agree on the basic principles of the needs of a
welfare state.
3. A collective sense of empathy for the underclass (the small size of the coun-
try and relative homogeneity favoured this).
4. A 'rights' culture and a commitment to the virtues of equality and justice.
He then asked how these factors might apply to Botswana. Briefly he felt that
humanitarian and voluntary organisations have not been very influential; the
political party in power has only recently become more committed to welfare ide-
als; and the sense of empathy for the weak has not been adequately cultivated.
Too much stress has been placed on the capacity of the extended family to care for
the disadvantaged. He concludes by stating that in his opinion "in poor, develop-
ing countries, there is definitely a role for the state in the creation and distribution
of resources and wealth".
